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THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RECORDS: WHEN
MAY THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA COPY AUDIO AND
VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE?
United States v. Edwards
672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982)
BENJAMIN L. SELLS*
INTRODUCTION

It has been six years since the United States Supreme Court in
Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc.,I refused media access to the socalled Watergate tapes for copying for subsequent broadcast. 2 Although four dissents were recorded, 3 only two dissenters favored allowing access to the tapes.4 The remaining dissenters joined with the
majority in concluding that access should be denied, albeit for somewhat different reasons.5 Despite this general concurrence against access, the Court in Nixon made clear that there is a general common law
right to copy judicial records 6 and thus set the stage for a struggle
various factors to be
among the circuit courts of appeals regarding the
7
considered in deciding when to permit access.
* B.A. History, 1976, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; M.A. Philosophy and
Psychology of Religion, 1983, Southern Methodist University; J.D. expected 1985, IIT ChicagoKent College of Law.
1. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
2. Id at 6 i0- 11. For a further analysis of Nixon see infra notes 20-34 and accompanying
text.
3. Id at 611-12 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting in part); id at 612-13 (Marshall,
J., dissenting);-id at 613-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For further analysis of these dissents, see infra
note 34.
4. Id at 612-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id at 613-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. Id at 611-12 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting in part). See infra note 34.
6. "It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Id at 597. For further
analysis of this "common law right" see infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
7. For a general discussion of the circuits' responses to Nixon, see Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape Evidence: 4 Threat to the Fair Trial Right, 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
551-81 (March 1982). For an analysis centering on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decision in United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2nd Cir. 1980), see Note, Common Law Right ofAccess to JudicialRecords-CriminalDefendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 1981
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843-51. The confusion left by Nixon is also evident in surveying the relationship
between the lower court decisions and the appellate decisions cited in this comment. In United
States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'4 435 U.S. 589 (1978) the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a denial of access only to itself be reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Nixon. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a grant of access in In re Application of National Broadcasting Company,
Inc., et al. (United States v. Myers), 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), while in Belo Broadcasting Corp.
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In the years since Nixon, the issue of when broadcasters are to be
allowed to copy court records for broadcast has repeatedly come before
the circuit courts of appeal. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit first met the issue in United States v. Edwards.9 In
the four cases preceding Edwards,the circuits sought to clarify the relationship between the common law right of access and broader first
amendment concerns to and sought to reach some consensus on the relative weights to be given various factors in the decision whether to
grant access." Most notable among these considerations has been the
balancing of the right of access and the sixth amendment guarantee of
v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a denial of access. In United States v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a denial of access as did the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir.
1981). Nor has the access issue been confined to these cases, see, e.g., In re Application of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., and National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1168
(D.D.C. 1982) (videotaped deposition not encompassed by common law right to copy); United
States v. Pageau, 535 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (access to videotape allowed); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (access denied);
United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (access allowed); In re Application
of KSTP Television (United States v. Ming Sen Shiue), 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980) (access
denied).
8. In re Application of National Broadcasting Company, Inc., et al., Applicants, (United
States v. Myers), 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (hereinafter cited as Myers); In re Application of
National Broadcasting Company, Inc., American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., CBS, Inc., and
Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc. (United States v. Criden), 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981)
(hereinafter cited as Criden); In re Application of National Broadcasting Company, Inc., American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., and CBS, Inc., (United States v. Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (hereinafter cited as Jenrette); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1981) (hereinafter cited as Belo); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982) (hereinafter cited as Edwards).
9. 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982).
10. The Court in Nixon made explicit that while its holding in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), extended first amendment protection to access to informationcontained
in court records, this did not include the right of physical access to court records not made physically accessible to the public. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608-10. Despite this clear ruling by the Court
that the right to copy judicial records does not rest on the first amendment but on common law
tradition, a few of the circuits, and commentators alike, have remained fascinated with this question. See, e.g., Criden, 648 F.2d at 820-22; Belo, 654 F.2d at 427-29; Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video andAudio Tape Evidence, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. at 554-56, 559-62, 568-71. See also infra
notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
11. For the factors suggested by the Nixon court, see infra notes 92-96 and accompanying
text. In the cases preceding Edwards, the circuits were remarkably consistent in the factors they
believed relevant, although they differed on the weights due each factor. Among the factors commonly cited were (1) the presumption of access, Myers, 635 F.2d at 952; Criden, 648 F.2d at 81920; Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 612; Belo, 654 F.2d at 429; (2) that the evidence went to possible misconduct of public officials or agencies, Myers, 635 F.2d at 952; Criden, 648 F.2d at 819, 822; Jenrette,
653 F.2d at 614; Belo, 654 F.2d at 429; (3) the nature of video or audio evidence as distinguished
from written evidence, Myers, 635 F.2d at 953; Criden, 648 F.2d at 824; (4) protection of innocent
third parties, Criden, 648 F.2d at 825, 829; Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 619-20; and (5) the threat to
pending or future trials, Myers, 653 F.2d at 950, 953; Criden, 648 F.2d at 826-28; Jenrette,653 F.2d
at 615-19; Belo, 654 F.2d at 431-32.
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a fair trial. 12 In an initial surge of cases following Nixon, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third and District of Columbia Circuits seemed to be united in asserting that the right of access
should be given considerable weight, especially when counterbalanced
by mere hypothetical threats to a fair trial.' 3 In 1981, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the pattern set by the other circuits and held in Belo Broadcasting Corp. v.
Clark14 that the sixth amendment fair trial guarantee must be granted
prevailing weight and that the common law access right is but one of
5
the varying interests to be considered.'
Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Edwards held that the district court had not
abused its discretion by forbidding access to audio recordings admitted
into evidence during trial.' 6 However, the Seventh Circuit also made
clear that in future cases there should be a strong presumption in favor
of the common law right to inspect and copy records,' 7 and that the
presumption should be overcome only on the basis of "articulable facts
known to the court [and] not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or
18
conjecture."
This comment will review the Edwards decision, focusing first on
the historic context of the case so as to highlight the principal unresolved issues presented to the Seventh Circuit. Next, the facts of the
case and the holding of the district court will be considered. The Seventh Circuit's opinion will then be presented and analyzed. It will be
shown that the Seventh Circuit has offered a compromise that upholds
the common law right to copy court records for broadcast in the face of
hypothetical challenges on fair trial grounds, while keeping intact the
discretionary authority needed by lower courts to respond to contingencies presented at the trial level.
PRIOR CASE LAW

The common law right of access to judicial records originated in
England where access to records of the King's courts was deemed the
right of every subject. 19 Other judicial records were also open to the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See supra note II (factor 5).
See, e.g., Myers, 635 F.2d at 952; Criden, 648 F.2d at 820-23; Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 621.
654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id at 431-34.
672 F.2d 1289, 1295 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id at 1290, 1294, 1296.
Id at 1294.
See Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape Evidence, 50 FORDHAM L.
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public, although usually on the basis of some interest in the records, for
example, the bringing or defense of a legal action. This "interest" test
has been dropped in the United States, and the presumption has been
to allow access within the discretion of the court. 20 Furthermore, although under the common law access for the purpose of inspection was
co-extensive with the right to copy records, the advent of electronic evidence such as audio and video tapes has necessitated a distinction between the two rights. This distinction was clearly drawn by the United
21
States Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
In Nixon, the Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals
22
for the District of Columbia decision in United States v. Mitchell
granting media access to the Watergate tapes for copying for broadcast.
Although recognizing a general common law right to copy judicial
records, the Court made clear that this right is subject to the discretion
of the trial court. 23 In distinguishing between the right of access for the
purpose of copying and the right of access for inspection, the Nixon
Court held that the right to copy judicial records is not guaranteed by
either the first or sixth amendments but is a common law right. 24 The
25
Court reiterated its earlier holding in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn
that the first amendment guarantees access to the informationcontained
26
in judicial records, not access to the physical records themselves.
REV. at 557. For further historical background on the common law origins of the right of access,
see State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-38 (Sup. Ct. 1879).
20. See Nixon, 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7.
21. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
22. 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The District of Columbia Circuit had held that the common law right to copy records was predicated on grounds similar to basic constitutional freedoms:
Like the First Amendment, then, the right of inspection serves to produce "an informed
and enlightened public opinion." Like the public trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, the right serves to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution," to promote the search for truth, and to assure "confidence in...
judicial remedies." And in the instant case, like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the right of inspection serves to promote equality by providing those who were and those
who were not able to gain entry to Judge Sirica's cramped courtroom the same opportunity to hear the White House tapes.
551 F.2d at 1258 (footnotes omitted). In light of these analogies, the court in Mitchell found a
strong presumption in favor of access which could not be overcome by mere hypothetical risks of
fair trial infringement. Id at 1261. On this basis the court had ruled that the tapes be released for
copying once a suitable plan for release had been adopted. Id. at 1265.
23. 435 U.S. at 597-98.
24. Id at 609-10. Some courts have held the right of access to be of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (7th Cir. 1982); Associated Press v. United
States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist., 705 F.2d 1143-45 (9th Cir. 1983). However, in Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802-03 (11 th Cir. 1983), the court followed Nixon in holding that the right
of access is a common law right.
25. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
26. 435 U.S. at 609. The Court based this ruling in part on the principle that the press has no
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Thus, physicalaccess remains a common law right, but is not protected
by the first amendment. Along the same lines, the Court held that the

right to copy judicial records is not guaranteed by sixth amendment
demands of public trial.27 Again, the Court emphasized that the issue
is one of information. The Court held that, "[t]he requirement of a
public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and
press to attend trial and to report what they have observed."' 28 The
sixth amendment does not require that the records resulting from or
pertaining to a trial be made physically available to the public.
Having established the context of its decision, the Court then
noted that its task typically would be to weigh the various interests involved in the access dispute. 29 Along these lines, the court found both
"the incremental gain in public understanding . . . that arguably
would flow from the release of aural copies of tapes,"' 30 and "the presumption-however gauged-in favor of public access to judicial
records" 3 1 to favor granting access to the tapes. However, the Court
found no need to balance these pro-access factors against the interests
served by a denial of access. Rather, the Court found dispositive "an
additional, unique element" 32 not argued by either party in the dispute,
namely the Presidential Recordings Act in which Congress had prescribed the procedures to be followed in releasing the tapes. 33 Relying
right of access superior to that of the general public and that the public had never been granted
physical access to the tapes in question. Id Further, the question of physical access-meaning
the right to copy and publish-did not rest on the same first amendment grounds that protected
access to information. Id With regard to the tapes in question, the Court noted that there was "no
question of a truncated flow of information to the public." Id
27. Id at 610. The Court rejected the argument that public understanding would remain
incomplete absent the ability to actually listen to the tapes. The Court held that this same argument could be applied to live testimony, and yet there was no constitutional right to record and
broadcast such testimony. Id The Court's reasoning here, however, ignored the crucial distinction between live testimony and pre-recorded events. The distinction was later drawn in Edwards
that unlike live broadcast, recordings of pre-existing events do not influence or allow the participants to posture or otherwise change their behavior to play to a television or radio audience.
Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1295. Despite the distinction, the Court in Nixon held that the sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial does not mandate physical access to court records. 435 U.S. at
610.
28. 435 U.S. at 610.
29. Id at 602.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id at 603.
33. The Presidential Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695, 1695-96 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1978 & Supp. III 1979)) (hereinafter termed the Act) directed
the Administrator of General Services to take custody of the Presidential tapes and documents, to
supervise screening of these materials in order to edit and return to the President private material,
and to release the remaining material for use in judicial proceedings and, ultimately, to the public.
435 U.S. at 603. The provisions of the Act, however, specified that this procedure was to apply to
originalrecordings.Id. n.15. The majority held that while the Act did not reach the copies of the
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on the Act, the Court held that "we need not weigh the parties' competing arguments [since] . . . [tihe presence of an alternative means of

public access tips the scales in favor of denying release.

' 34

By deciding

the case on the basis of the Act, the Court left open the key question of
the weight to be given the presumption favoring access in future disputes. This question thus became central to the access controversy.
In United States v. Myers, 35 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed a trial court decision to release for copying
videotapes presented for evidence in one of the "Abscam" trials, 36 even
though the trial was still in progress and juries had yet to be selected as
to related charges pending against three of the defendants. 37 Because
Nixon had been decided on a statutory basis, 38 the Second Circuit
turned to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision in Mitchell as the leading precedent. Following the Mitchell view that the common law right to copy records should not be
denied on the basis of a hypothetical second trial, 39 the Second Circuit
went even further and held that once evidence was admitted at trial, "it
would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify [denial of
access for copying]. ' ' 40 The court rejected the argument that Myers'
trial could be prejudiced by access because the jury had already seen
tapes at issue, "court release of copies of materials subject to the Act might frustrate the achievement of the legislative goals," id at 606, and therefore access should be denied since there was "an
alternative means of public access." Id.
34. Id. at 605-06. The dissents in Nixon all dealt with the application of the Act to the tapes.
Justices White and Brennan opined that § 101(a) of the Act did not reach the tapes in question.
Rather, relying on § 101(b) of the Act, the Justices argued that it was irrelevant that the tapes were
not originals since "like the conversations on the originals, [the conversations on the copies] occurred during the relevant period [covered by the Act]. Furthermore, if the originals are of historical value, the copies are of equal significance." 435 U.S. at 612 (White, J., and Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part). Justice Marshall reached the opposite conclusion, noting that neither petitioner nor respondent believed the Act applicable and that the express limitation of the Act to
original tape recordings should be strictly construed, thus allowing release of the copies in order to
"vindicate a precious common law right [i.e. of access to judicial records], one that predates the
Constitution itself." Id at 612 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To further buttress his view, Justice
Marshall cited legislative history showing that Congress intended the Act to ensure "the American
people . . . full access to all facts about the Watergate affair," id at 613, citing S. REP. No. 931181, p. 4 (1974). Justice Stevens also read the Act as mandating public access to the tapes as
quickly as possible and that the intent could be best satisfied by release of the tapes. Id. at 616
(Stevens, J., dissenting). That the majority found the Act dispositive in denying access Justice
Stevens found "ironic, to put it mildly." Id at 617.
35. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. For a full analysis of the Myers facts and decisions see Note, Common Law Right of
Access to Judicial Records-Criminal Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 843-51.
37. 635 F.2d at 952-53.
38. Id at 950.
39. Id
40. Id at 952. Indeed, the court went even further, noting that the presumption favoring
access "is especially strong in a case like this where the evidence shows the actions of public
officials, both the defendants and law enforcement personnel." Id
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the videotapes and the trial judge was entitled to rely on the jury's ob-

servance of his order to avoid exposure to media replays of the tapes.4 1
As to the pending trials of the other defendants, the court held that
although televising of the tapes would increase public awareness, 4 2 this
did not pose a significant enough risk to justify restricting the public
right of access to courtroom evidence. 4 3 The court noted that defendants and news media alike often overestimate the impact of media coverage and that the opportunity for voir dire examination," and the
more extreme options of continuance or change of venue, are satisfactory methods by which to deal with possible difficulty in impanelling a
45
fair jury.
Less than one year later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in United States v. Criden46 followed the Second Circuit's lead and reversed and remanded a trial court decision denying
access to videotape evidence. 47 Although not as emphatic as the Myers
court, the Third Circuit in Criden also found a strong presumption
favoring access. 48 The Criden court further held that because the trial
court's decision was "not dependent in the main on particular observations of the trial court" 49 that in the interest of consistency of judgment5 0 its decision was not to be accorded "the narrow review reserved
for discretionary decisions based on first-hand observations." 5 1 The
41. Id at 953.
42. The court held:
We do not doubt the premise of [the] claim that televising the tapes will greatly increase
the number of people with knowledge of their content. . . [nior do we doubt that seeing
the tapes on television will create a stronger impression of the events among those who
already have been exposed to news accounts of their contents.
Id
43. "We disagree ...

that the likelihood of. . . enhanced awareness .

poses the kind of

risk to fair trials . . . that justifies curtailing the public's right of access to courtroom evidence."
Id.
44. Id
45. Id at 953-54.
46. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
47. Like the Myers case, Criden involved the FBI Abscam operation revealing alleged bribery
and related offenses of public officials. The evidence in question, like that in Myers, visually
depicted alleged acts of influence peddling. For further details, see Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1980) and United States v. Jannotti, 504 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
48. 648 F.2d at 819.
49. Id. at 818.
50. Id
51. Id Thus, the Criden court extended appellate review to the relevance and weight of the
factors considered by the trial court as opposed to applying the traditional test for abuse of discretion of whether the necessary questions had been entertained and reasonably answered. The court
distinguished the trial court ruling from "those situations where the decision depends on firsthand observation or direct contact with the litigation." Id at 817. Rather, the Criden court found
compelling the interests of consistency of judgment and, more fundamentally, the notion that
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Third Circuit then went on to hold that the important right of the public to open courts, which was furthered by the access right, could not be
denied on the basis of conjecture about possible fair trial
52
infringement.
In United States v. Jenrette,53 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was afforded another opportunity to expand on its ruling in Mitchell five years earlier. As had the courts in
Myers and Criden before it, the Jenrette court simply refused to accord
hypothetical fair trial risks sufficient weight to overcome the strong presumption in favor of access. 54 In reversing the trial court's denial of
access, the court noted that, although possible injury to innocent third
persons may in some instances militate against access, the risk of such
injury would be obviated by editing out those portions which create the
risk.55 However, the court made clear that such editing was appropriate only where the objectionable portions were so damaging as to out56
weigh the strong presumption favoring unrestricted access.
Against this background of cases suggesting that (1) there is a
strong presumption in favor of access and (2) that this presumption
allows broad ranging appellate review of trial court discretion, came
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion in Belo
Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark.57 In Belo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's denial of access to videotapes introduced in the so-called
"Brilab" trial.58 The Belo court rejected the Criden court's view that
appellate review in access disputes should reach "the relevance and
"1unreviewable discretion offends a deep sense of fitness in our view of the administration of justice." Id at 818, citing Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion ofthe Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 641-42. Furthermore, although it may be argued that trial courts should
be accorded broad discretion when faced with new circumstances and variables, the Criden court
considered this factor in light of the need for appellate guidance so as to assure predictable, consistent results. 648 F.2d at 818.
52. Id at 826-28. The court found that the trial court had given inadequate weight to alternative means of protecting the fair trial right, such as voir dire. Id at 828. While the fair trial
issue was paramount, the court also was unconvinced by the trial judge's reliance on a number of
other factors, including the difference between videotape evidence and other forms of evidence, id
at 823-24; concerns about the initial admissibility of the tapes, id at 828; the prohibitions against
broadcasting actual trials, id at 828-29, and; the existence of possible "scurrilous and libelous"
statements about third parties, id at 829.
53. 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Again, this case arose out of the Abscam operation, and
again, the evidence in question depicted influence peddling by government officials.
54. Id at 615-17.
55. "If the objections are found to be meritorious, the district court may sanitize the objectionable portions of the tapes to remove the offending remarks or order that the identity of the
innocent third person be deleted." Id at 620 (footnote omitted).
56. Id at 620-21.
57. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Id at 425.
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weight of the factors [considered by the trial court]." 59 Rather, the
Fifth Circuit, relying on Nixon, held that the decision fell firmly within
the trial court's discretionary powers. 60 Thus, the Belo court held that
the trial court order was subject to reversal only on the basis of egregious error. 6' Likewise, the court rejected the standards followed by
the Myers and Jenrettecourts because they too were seen as holding the
discretionary authority open to excessively broad based appellate
62
review.
The Fifth Circuit further held that the right to access should not be
granted priority over possible fair trial conflicts when those conflicts are
uncertain or merely hypothetical. 63 The court stated that
[tihe informed and considered judgment of the trial judge should
prevail in any choice between such equally speculative results. It is
better to err, if err we must, on the side of generosity in the protection
64
of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.
Hence, in the years since Nixon, the circuits have disagreed on
(1) the comparative weight to be given the presumption in favor of access and fair trial considerations, and (2) the accompanying question of
the applicable standard of appellate review of a trial court's discretionary rulings regarding access. In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit attempted to bridge this impasse.

59. The [Criden] court found that a decision on release of tapes "is not accorded the
narrow review reserved for discretionary decisions based on first hand observations" of
the trial judge. We have considered this analysis presented by the Third Circuit but are
unable to follow it beyond its foundation--that the decision to grant or deny access to
tapes during the course of a criminal prosecution is not based on "first hand observations" of the presiding trial judge. When the concern is the efficient administration of
justice and the provision to defendants of fair trials, the consideration of competing values is one heavily reliant on the observations and insights of the presiding judge.
Id at 431 n. 18 (citations omitted).
60. The Belo court cited the following passage from Nixon as determinative: "The question
whether a trial judge has properly exercised his discretion in releasing copies of trial exhibits arises
infrequently. It is essentially a question answered by reference to the circumstances of a particular
case. Only an egregious abuse of discretion should merit reversal." 654 F.2d at 431 (quoting
Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 613-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Notably, the Belo
court here rested its opinion on the dissent by Justice Stevens rather than on the language of the
majority. Id. at 430-31.
61. 654 F.2d at 431. See supra note 60.
62. "In our judgment, the opinion in Nixon v. Warner Communications offers no basis from
which one can derive the overpowering presumption in favor of access discovered by the Second
and District of Columbia Circuits." Id at 433-34. Further, the Belo court noted that, "[ilf the
courts' approaches in Myers and Jenrette are misguided, as we suggest, then the Criden court
shares that error." Id, n.25.
63. Id at 434.
64. Id at 431.
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FACTS OF EDWARDS

In November of 1980, Martin K. Edwards, a state Senator and
President Pro Tempore of the Indiana State Legislature, and Francis B.
Kendall, a private businessman, were tried on charges relating to bribes
paid in return for influencing legislation. 65 During the trial, an audio
recording of a telephone conversation between Edwards and John L.
Cline was admitted into evidence and played in open court. 66 The day
before, full transcripts of the tape recordings had been published in
The Indianapolis News and The Indianapolis Star newspapers. 67 After
the recording had been admitted into evidence, Video-Indiana, Inc., a
television broadcasting station, and Mid-America Radio, Inc., a radio
station, informally requested the court to allow copying of the recording for broadcast. 68 The court instructed the stations (hereinafter
termed the "Broadcasters") to submit formal applications. 69 On November 20, 1980, the Broadcasters applied for permission to copy, for
broadcast contemporaneous with the trial, all video and audio recordings already admitted or which might be admitted into evidence. 70 After hearing oral arguments, at which counsel for both the defendants
and the United States opposed the grant of access, the court denied the
7
Broadcasters' applications. '
The trial court gave three reasons justifying its decision to deny
access. 72 First, the court expressed concern that to allow access during
the trial might be interpreted by the jury as placing a judicial imprima-3
7
tur upon evidence which might be overcome by subsequent evidence.
Second, the court ruled that broadcast of the recording might make it
difficult to draw a jury in an anticipated tax evasion trial of defendant
Edwards. 74 Last, the court relied on a resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States reaffirming a ban against contemporaneous broadcast of trials as a factor militating against allowing the
65. 672 F.2d at 1290. Details of the bribery scheme are discussed in United States v. Kendall,
665 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1981).
66. 672 F.2d at 1290.
67. Id at 1291.
68. Id
69. Id
70. An application was also filed by McGraw-Hill Broadcasting, Inc. Although their request
was also denied, they are not a party to the Edwards appeal. Id n.4.
71. Although the United States initially opposed access, once it became clear that Edwards'
second trial would be completed before the issue of access was finally decided, the Government
withdrew its opposition. Id
72. The decision denying access was delivered from the bench. No written memorandum
was issued by the court. Id
73. Id
74. Id
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copying of the recording. 75
The Broadcasters appealed the district court order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 76 In order to fully
explore the issues presented, the court of appeals requested an independent attorney to file a brief and argue as amicus in support of the
77
trial court's ruling.
The Seventh Circuit first held that, contrary to the argument of the
amicus, the issue was not moot even though the ending of the defend78
ant's trial had rendered contemporaneous broadcast impossible.
Agreeing with the Broadcasters, the court held that the dispute was
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 79
75. Id.Apparently the trial judge was referring to Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges. 672 F.2d at 1295. Canon 3A(7) reads in pertinent part:
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of
these duties, the following standards apply:
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial
administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investigative,
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate
court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i)
the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or
recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has
been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in
educational institutions.
76. 672 F.2d at 1291.
77. Id The court explained that an amicus was needed "[blecause the answering brief of [the]
defendants . . . was wholly perfunctory in nature and the Government's brief indicated that it
would not oppose release of the tape if.. .the second trial of Edwards was completed before oral
argument." Id
78. It is reasonably foreseeable that in other criminal trials similar applications for access to tape recordings . . .will be made . . . It is also likely that in such cases the
criminal trials will be of sufficiently short duration that an order denying access will
evade appellate review during the period in which contemporaneous access could be
granted. . . . Thus, while it would be impossible for us to direct the district court to
now accord the specific relief requested, mootness does not preclude consideration of the
merits.
Id.at 1292 (citations omitted).
79. Id.at 1291 (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). See
also supra note 78. Thus, the court considered this case to fall within a traditional exception to the
mootness doctrine.
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Turning to the merits of the case, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Nixon v. Warner Communications,80 and held that
although there is a clear common law right to inspect and copy judicial
records, that right is not absolute. Rather, the right is left to the discretion of the trial court to be decided in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of a particular case. 81 Considering the trial court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit found that the court had made a conscientious
and informed decision and had not abused its discretion. 82 Although
83
the Seventh Circuit found neither the Judicial Conference Resolution
nor the pendency of trial8 4 sufficient grounds for denial of access, it did
find the threat to Edwards' future trial "more than merely hypothetical" and thus sufficient to support the discretionary ruling denying
85
access.
Although affirming the trial court in Edwards, the Seventh Circuit
also held that in future cases a strong presumption should be granted in
favor of access. 86 Where there is a conflict between this presumption
and the defendant's right to a fair trial, access should be denied only
"on the basis of articulable facts known to the court, not on the basis of
87
unsupported hypothesis or conjecture.
UNITED STATES V. EDWARDS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit began
its opinion in Edwardsby drawing upon Nixon for the proposition that,
88
although there is a general common law right to copy judicial records,
this right is not absolute.8 9 The decision whether to grant access to evidence for copying is always within "the sound discretion of the trial
court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." 90 Although Nixon did not involve a
true balancing of interests, 9' the Seventh Circuit canvassed some of the
80. 435 U.S. 589. For further analysis of Nixon, see infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
81. 672 F.2d at 1292-93 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-99).
82. Id at 1295. For analysis of this ruling, see infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
83. Id at 1295. For further analysis, see infra notes 1I 1-14 and accompanying text.
84. Id at 1295-96. For further analysis of this point, see infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
85. Id at 1296. For further analysis of this point, see infra notes 122-26 and accompanying
text.
86. Id.at 1290, 1294, 1296.
87. Id.at 1294.
88. 672 F.2d at 1292-93 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-99). See also supra note 19-21 and
accompanying text.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id at 1293. See also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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factors cited in Nixon as possible factors for consideration, among these
whether the material sought would "be used to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal; ' 92 whether the petitioner sought to use the evidence as "reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption...
or as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing;" 93 whether the court had already permitted "considerable public access;" 94 whether access would appreciably enhance
public understanding; 95 and whether granting the request for access
would prejudice the due process rights of a defendant. 96 The Seventh
Circuit ended its review of Nixon by noting that the Court had indicated that trial court discretion must be guided by a "sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to . . . [the] production [of the
materials]," 9 7 and by the "presumption-however gauged-in favor of
public access." 9 8 On the basis of this review, and after emphasizing
that Nixon had been decided on the basis of the Presidential Recordings Act, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the central unanswered
question was the strength to be granted the presumption in favor of
access. 99
In analyzing the access presumption, the Seventh Circuit noted the
split among the circuits. 100 The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that
the right to access rests on common law tradition and that "a number
of factors may militate against public access."''
The court then noted
that the common law right "supports and furthers many of the same
interests which underlie those freedoms protected by the Constitution." 0 2 Although the court refused to hold that only exceptional
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
resolved

Id.(quoting 435 U.S. at 598).
Id
Id (quoting 435 U.S. at 599 n.11).
Id (citing 435 U.S. at 602).
Id.
Id (quoting 435 U.S. at 603).
Id
"Subsequent court of appeals decisions have addressed the critical question left unby Warner Communications, namely the strength of the presumption in favor of public

access." Id
100. Id.at 1293-94.

See also supra notes 7, 8, 35-64 and accompanying text.

101. 672 F.2d at 1294 (quoting 654 F.2d at 434).
102. 672 F.2d at 1294. On this point the Seventh Circuit turned to Mitchell, where Chief
Judge Bazelon wrote:
This common law right is not some arcane relic of ancient English law. To the contrary,
the right is fundamental to a democratic state. . . . Like the First Amendment,. .. the
right of inspection serves to produce "an informed and enlightened public opinion."
Like the public trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, the right serves to "safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution," to promote the
search for truth, and to assure "confidence in ... judicial remedies." And ... like the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the right of inspection serves to promote equality by
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circumstances will justify non-access, as had the Second Circuit in Myers,103 it did conclude that there should be a strong presumption in
favor of access which can be overcome "only on the basis of articulable
facts known to the court, [and] not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjecture."104 Further, the court made clear that the trial court
must clearly state the reasons for its decision, "so as to permit appellate
review of whether relevant factors were considered and given appropri10 5
ate weight."
Turning to the merits of the case, the court concluded that the trial
10 6
court in Edwards had not abused its discretion by denying access.
The court was impressed that the trial court had been forced to act
without clear direction from either the Supreme Court or the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. 107 Faced with this precedential vacuum, the
trial judge had been forced to rely on the Supreme Court's vague opinion in Nixon, the Second Circuit opinion in Myers allowing access, and
the District Court opinion in Criden denying access. 0 8 Of these cases,
the trial judge had opted for the Criden court's denial of access on the
basis of possible fair trial conflicts and articulated three reasons for denying access.I °9 The Seventh Circuit was "unwilling to say that this
course of conduct constituted an abuse of discretion.""10
The Seventh Circuit found the trial court's reliance on the Judicial
Conference Resolution prohibiting the broadcasting of trial unwarranted.It I Noting that the resolution was based "on apprehension
about the effect that contemporaneous broadcast of trial proceedings
might have on the conduct of the trial itself,"' " 2 the Seventh Circuit
providing those who were and those who were not able to gain entry to.

.

. [the] court-

room the same opportunity to hear the . . . tapes.

Id at 1294 (quoting Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258 (footnotes omitted; brackets added)).
103. 635 F.2d at 952.
104. 672 F.2d at 1294. Further, the Edwards court noted that this is "[a]U the more... true in
the present case since the trial bore upon the conduct of a public official." Id n. 11, (citing Criden,
648 F.2d at 822, and Myers, 635 F.2d at 952).
105. 672 F.2d at 1294.
106. id at 1295. Presaging its implicit holding that while the trial judge had not abused his
discretion this did not mean the Seventh Circuit believed him correct, the court noted that, "[o]f
course, nothing in this decision precludes the Broadcasters from seeking post-trial access to the
tape for the purpose of copying and broadcasting. Any decision on such a motion shall be guided
by and consistent with the principles articulated herein." Id n. 13. See also infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text.
107. 672 F.2d at 1295.
108. Id Of course, the trial judge did not have available the later Third Circuit reversal of the
district court in Criden.
109. Id See also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
110. Id
11. Id
112. Id (quoting Criden, 648 F.2d at 828-29).
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found no like threat with regard to a recording of a pre-existing
event."t 3 Unlike contemporaneous broadcast, said the court, recordings of prior events do not allow the participants to "posture or other4
wise change their behavior to play before . . .[an] audience.""1
Regarding the pendency of trial as a factor to be weighed in deciding whether to allow access, the court deemed it necessary for the trial
court to carefully consider the effect of access on the proceedings."t 5
Again, however, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that such a consideration should be made in light of a strong presumption in favor of access." t6 The court found that, because the question of access usually
would arise only after the jury had already been exposed to the evidence in question, the trial judge ordinarily could conclude that the
possibility of prejudice arising from repeated exposure was so remote
as to not threaten a fair trial.1 7 However, in the exceptional case,
where the publicity surrounding the trial had made jury selection difficult and had created a "circus atmosphere around the trial, . . .11or
where the administrative and mechanical difficulties" attending copying of the evidence would interfere with the proceedings,' 19 then denial
of access might be required. Because the decision whether to allow or
deny access depends upon the particular circumstances surrounding a
case, the court held that the decision is one which falls within the trial
court's discretionary authority. 20 The court also noted that the problem of a jury interpreting the permitting of access as a judicial imprimatur on the evidence in question could normally be resolved by a firm
instruction by the trial judge that the court was expressing no opinion
2
on the merits of the evidence.' '
'

113. Id.
114. Id (quoting Criden, 648 F.2d at 828-29). The trial judge's blurring of the distinct issues
of broadcast of live testimony and that of recordings of pre-existing events repeated a like blurring
by the Court in Nixon. See supranote 27. The Criden and Edwardscourts, however, do not stand
alone in their distinction between these issues. See, e.g., Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 n.5 and Jenrette,
653 F.2d at 620 n.60. Both of these latter cases were also cited by the Edwards court. 672 F.2d at
1295.
115. Id
116. Id at 1295-96.
117. Id. at 1296.
118. Id As an example of such an instance, the court cited Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
119. 672 F.2d at 1295 (citing to the decision of the lower court in Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639
(D.D.C. 1975)).
120. We can state no hard-and-fast rule. Indeed, it is [biecause of the difficulties inherent
in formulating a broad yet clear rule to govern the variety of situations in which the right
of access must be reconciled with legitimate countervailing public or private interests, the
decision as to access is one which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Id at 1296 (quoting Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 613).
121. Thus, the court found unconvincing the trial judge's concern about such a judicial impri-

770
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Related to the question of the pendency of trial was the trial
court's justification in Edwards to deny access because of the resulting
difficulty in impanelling a jury in subsequent trials involving the defendants. 122 The Seventh Circuit agreed that when an appeal is pending it may be proper to consider whether reversal would require a new
trial. 123 In Edwards the Seventh Circuit found that the pending tax
evasion charges against Edwards made a trial more than merely hypothetical and thus did provide a basis for the trial judge's decision to
deny access.124 Although the trial judge had himself noted that the difficulty in impanelling a jury could be overcome, 25 the Seventh Circuit
nevertheless held that an abuse of discretion was not present where
"the court considered both the problem of tainting the current trial and
26
the expected trial."1
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES

V EDWARDS

When Edwardsreached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the court was faced with conflicting precedent. The
Second Circuit had held that only extraordinary circumstances would
justify denial of access. 127 The Third Circuit had not only held there to
be a strong presumption in favor of access, but also held that appellate
review should not be limited to the narrow review normally accorded
discretionary rulings but should extend to the relevance and weight accorded the conflicting interests considered. 128 The Fifth Circuit had
rejected both a strong presumption in favor of access and the notion of
matur on the evidence in question and re-emphasized the strong presumption in favor of access to
be given in future cases. Id at 1296.
122.

Id.

123. The issue may arise, as here, because the defendant has yet to be separately tried on
other charges, because the evidence could reasonably have an effect on trials involving

other individuals, or perhaps for other reasons. Where the application [for access] is
made after trial, while an appeal is pending, it may be proper to consider that reversal
would require a new trial.
Id Turning to the precedent on this issue, the court noted that, "[in general, those courts which
find the presumption of access to be strong tend to discount the risk of harm to other proceedings,

whereas those which minimize the importance of the presumption accentuate potential jeopardy
to other cases." Id The court, however, refused to choose sides and claimed it "would be folly for
us to attempt now, through detailed analysis of other decisions, to state a broad rule covering all

possible situations. Rather we address ourselves simply to the relevant circumstances in the present case." Id.
124. Id
125. Id at 1291. The trial court had expressly noted that through proper voir dire examination a jury could be selected "with a fair and impartial attitude." Id.This acknowledgement, in
the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, made the case closer, but still could not overcome the respect
granted the discretionary ruling in this case. Id.at 1296.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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broad-based review. 129 The Supreme Court's decision in Nixon was of
little help regarding the weight due the access right,130 but did seem to
suggest that the decision as to access was meant to lie within the trial
court's discretionary authority.' 3' Presented with these diverse holdings, the Seventh Circuit decision attempted to mold a compromise
position.
By first rejecting the Second Circuit's view in Myers that only exceptional circumstances will justify denial of access, the Seventh Circuit signaled a move toward compromise. However, despite its partial
rejection of the Myers holding, the court assumed a strong stance, as
132
had the Second and Third Circuits, in favor of access.
As for the Third Circuit's Criden decision, the Seventh Circuit in
Edwardsrelied on Nixon to move away from the broad-based appellate
review espoused in Criden.1 33 Indeed, it is significant that the Edwards
decision did not hold the trial judge's denial of access to be the correct
decision. Rather, the Seventh Circuit restricted its review to the trial
judge's conduct and the narrow question of whether there had been an
abuse of discretion.' 34 Because the trial judge had been faced with
vague and confusing precedent and had conscientiously performed his
task in articulating three reasons for his decision, the Seventh Circuit
declined to rule he had abused his discretionary authority. 135 Of the
three reasons given by the trial court, only one, the threat to future
129. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
131. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 599 (majority opinion), 613-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. "[W]hile we are unwilling to go so far as the Second Circuit's statement that only exceptional circumstances will justify non-access, we hold that there is a strong presumption in support
of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records." 672 F.2d at 1294 (footnote
omitted).
133. Id at 1293, citing the Court in Nixon where it stated "[Tihe decision as to access is one
best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599).
134. The Edwards court refused to consider whether, without sufficient guidance, the trial
judge had properly decided the access question. Thus, the court refused to follow the Criden
approach which held concerns for predictability and consistency of discretionary decisions to demand broad appellate review. Rather, the Edwards court seems to be following the other line of
argument noted and rejected by Criden that:
[Wihen circumstances are either so variable or so new that it is not yet advisable to frame
a binding rule of law, trial courts may be given discretion until the factors important to a
decision and the weight to be accorded them emerge from the montage of fact patterns
which arise. . . . Often, in time, the contours of a guiding rule or even principle may
develop as the courts begin to identify the policies which should control.
648 F.2d at 818. Following the clear ruling in Edwards favoring access, and considering the
court's signal to the Broadcasters in Edwards that renewed applications would be considered in
this light, see supra note 106, the Seventh Circuit apparently believes that while the trial judge
properly exercised his discretion absent guidance, that guidance is now available and strongly
suggests permitting access to the tape in question.
135. 672 F.2d at 1295.
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trials, was considered by the Seventh Circuit to be sufficient to justify
the trial court's ruling, and even this one was notably weak in the eyes
of the court of appeals.' 36 By limiting its review to asking, (1) whether
the trial court had considered the problem of "tainting the current trial
and the expected trial,"' 37 and (2) whether the trial court had articulated facts known to it in denying access rather than relying on conjecture, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Criden approach and adopted the
38
Fifth Circuit's narrow standard of review in Belo.'
However, the Seventh Circuit was careful to adopt only that portion of the Belo holding related to the nature of appellate review. The
Edwards court rejected that portion of Belo which held that the presumption in favor of access was but one factor to be considered and
that possible fair trial conflicts should be given priority. The Seventh
Circuit emphasized instead that conjecture or hypothetical dangers to
fair trial rights are not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in
39
favor of access.1
IMPACT OF THE EDWARDS DECISION

The significance of the trial judge's position in Edwards cannot be
overestimated in understanding the Seventh Circuit's opinion. Clearly,
the Seventh Circuit was impressed both by the lack of guidance available to the lower court when faced with a difficult decision and the
judge's conscientious efforts to reach the correct decision. 40 However,
it is unlikely that were such a case to arise now, given a similar fact
situation and holding by the trial court, that denial of access would be
upheld. For now it is indisputable that the Seventh Circuit holds the
presumption in favor of access to be of such strength that it may be
overcome only by articulable dangers to other important rights. While
the decision of a trial court to deny access is still discretionary, it is now
a decision which must be made in the face of clear precedent granting a
strong presumption favoring access. With guidance on this point now
available, and with the Seventh Circuit's suggestions as to how to accommodate countervailing interests without denial of access, it is un136. Id at 1295 (rejecting the Judicial Conference Resolution); id at 1296 (suggesting the
pendency of trial insufficient to warrant denial of access in this case); id. (that judges considered
tainting of future trial sufficient to justify discretionary ruling in this case.) See also supra notes
111-26 and accompanying text.
137. ld at 1296.
138. Id at 1295. See also supra notes 59-62 (Belo court's limitation of discretionary review)
and 134 (rejection by Edwards court of Criden) and accompanying text.
139. Id at 1294.
140. Id at 1295.
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likely that denial of access will be upheld without a clear showing that
the trial court has exhausted alternative solutions.
Of course, the Edwards decision is but one in a string of appellate
court cases dealing with the right to copy judicial records for broadcast.
It remains to be seen whether the other circuits will seize upon Edwards
as a compromise opinion or whether they will continue to espouse their
own stances pending some clearer statement by the Supreme Court.
However, within the Seventh Circuit the decision of whether to grant
the firm and clearly articuor deny access now must be made within
4
lated boundaries set forth in Edwards.' '
CONCLUSION

In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit has issued a decision that potentially could resolve the split among the circuits concerning the guidelines of the right of access. Like the Second, Third and District of
Columbia circuits, the Seventh Circuit has held that there is a strong
presumption in favor of access. Like the Fifth Circuit, it has also held
that once guidelines are clear the decision of whether to grant access is
a discretionary one which should be accorded great respect at the appellate level. And, like all of the circuits which have grappled with the
issue, the Seventh Circuit has agreed that infringement of fair trial
guarantees is the strongest countervailing interest capable of rebutting
the presumption in favor of access. However, the threat to a fair trial
must be actual and not mere conjecture and all alternative methods of
guaranteeing a fair trial must be exhausted before denial of access will
be upheld.

141. Indeed, since Edwards, courts within the Seventh Circuit have already relied upon it in
allowing access. For example, in United States v. Shannon, 540 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the
court allowed access to audio recordings on the basis of the Edwards decision, noting that, "[wihile
the Court may deny access, the burden is upon the party seeking to interfere with [the] . . . common law right [of access] to demonstrate that justice requires denial of access. The Court may not,
however, deny access on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjecture." 540 F. Supp. at 771.
See also United States v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Edwards also has been
relied upon by other circuits to allow access, see, e.g., United States v. Mouzin, 559 F. Supp. 463
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Application of WFMJ Broadcasting Co. (United States v. Traficant), 566 F.
Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Moreover, it should be noted that the presumption favoring access
presumably extends beyond audio and visual tapes and film to all forms of physical evidence
amenable to copying such as computerized tapes or cards. The right also should extend to all
manner of copying of evidence, be it recording tapes or photographing exhibits.

